A SURVEY OF
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
THEORIES OF ETHNOMUSICOLOGY
FROM 1955 TO 2003

From “Sciencing about Music”
To “People Experiencing Music”

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to review the theories of ethnomusicology, to discuss the influence of post-modernity on ethnomusicological thinking, and to suggest implications for how ethnomusicology can apply to studying the role of song in Christian discipleship.

Merriam: The Foundational Model

Many authors credit Jaap Kunst (1955) as being the first to coin the word “Ethnomusicology.” Yet the first to formulate an influential theoretical framework for the newly named field was Alan Merriam. His theory has been criticized, modified, simplified, and misinterpreted, but many authors return to it again and again. No other ethnomusicological theory has endured for so long, nor formed the basis for so much ethnomusicology practice.

His theory is often quoted from his book The Anthropology of Music as "Music sound is the result of human behavioral processes that are shaped by the values, attitudes, and beliefs of the people who comprise a particular culture" (Merriam 1964:6). This has been simplified to consist of three parts: concepts, behavior, and sound. A people’s concept of music determines their musical behavior which produces the musical sound.

One of the strengths of Merriam’s model is its simplicity. In 1987 Timothy Rice proposed a “new” model based on Merriam’s model. Rice’s model is much more complex and difficult to understand, for it includes many levels and sublevels. Many authors appreciated his new approach, but Koskoff (1987) criticized him for oversimplifying Merriam’s model.

1 George List, 1979, puts the year at 1950.
Koskoff stresses that although Merriam’s model "has guided our field for more than two decades" (Koskoff 1987:497), few have appreciated its full scope. She argues that Merriam actually progressed in his book from his first model to a more developed model which is dynamic and distinguishes between the performer(s) and the listener(s).

A closer examination of the second chapter of Merriam’s book reveals that his proposed three-level model is dynamic. The performer and the listener both, upon performing and hearing the musical product, judge the result of the musical product. If it is satisfactory, the musical sound remains unchanged. If it is not pleasing, both form new criteria which will change their musical behavior and produce a new musical sound to be newly judged. As Merriam says, “Thus there is a constant feedback from the product to the concepts about music, and this is what accounts both for change and stability in a music system” (Merriam 1964:33).

In his proposed model, Merriam is trying to reconcile two disciplines that do not seem to intersect: the social sciences and the humanities. Thus when he says that ethnomusicology is “sciencing about music” (ibid.:25), the “sciencing” refers to the social sciences and the “music” to the humanities. Others have interpreted this phrase to mean that Merriam wanted to place ethnomusicology within the field of science (Gourlay 1978:5). Merriam is saying that ethnomusicology “partakes of both”; “what the ethnomusicologist seeks to create is his own bridge between the social sciences and the humanities” (Merriam 1964:25). The conflicts lies in the opinion that “the procedures and goals of ethnomusicology fall upon the side of the social sciences, while its subject matter is a humanistic aspect of man’s existence.” (ibid.)
This conflict of whether ethnomusicologists are, in the end, obtaining objective knowledge (science) or studying subjective feelings (experiences), has plagued the field for decades. Many complain that the field has lacked definition and direction (Merriam 1977:189; Herndon 1974:219; Rice 1997:101-102; Witzleben 1997:221,228; Kingsbury 1997:243), others have suggested that the discipline itself should disappear or be renamed (Kingsbury 1997, Seeger 1997, Kisliuk 1998), and others want it to be more applied (Davis 1992, Titon 1992, Sheehy 1992).

Why can’t ethnomusicologists come to some consensus? I suggest that one of the reasons is a changing world view that challenges the researcher’s basic assumptions. (One reason may be the lack of recognizing different sub-disciplines. Another is using scientific methods for research in the humanities.) Only when one recognizes what his or her own world view is can one then proceed to develop theories to apply it. A thorough review of the literature demonstrates that two (or more) different world views have divided ethnomusicologists since the Journal of Ethnomusicology first was published in 1958. And each world view has produced its own ethnomusicological theories.

Alan Merriam (1964) held a scientific world view with some basic assumptions. The first being that the investigator was the “objective other.” The second is that the basic method of investigation is that of data collection, analysis, and application. Underneath this second assumption is a belief in universal laws that govern our thinking. Geertz challenged this way of thinking, but I will return to him later. Merriam’s three-level, dynamic feedback theory is a work of genius way ahead of his time. (That’s why so many authors refer to his work.) Yet his theory only works within a scientific framework. If you change the assumptions, you have to find another theory.
The scientific worldview held a belief in evolution. This led ethnomusicologists to search for the origin of music. Also, in assuming that all music evolved from the same source, many believed that music was universal and had universal principles that governed it. If music had evolved, then “primitive” music must be closer to the source. Most early ethnomusicologists studied exotic music in far away places with this goal in mind (Nettl, Kunst, Blacking). Only when, after much research, ethnomusicologists “discovered” that the music they were studying was not “primitive”, but very complex, and that after comparing many musical cultures, they couldn’t find any universals, did they abandon the quest for origins and universals.

**Rice: Remodeling Ethnomusicology**

Merriam’s model has stood the test of time and his theory laid the foundation for ethnomusicological research as long as investigators maintained a scientific worldview. In 1987 Timothy Rice proposed a remodeling of ethnomusicology. He recognizes the influence and usefulness of Merriam’s model for the past twenty years, but argues that the model does not satisfactorily explain the relationship between music sound and human behavior. (Merriam’s model is mostly anthropological.) Musicologists and anthropologists still, he says, cannot come to agreement on their approaches to research, and many paradigms have been proposed to explain the connection between musical sound and musical behavior. Rice’s model is an attempt to solve this problem.

Rice, in searching for “formative processes in music,” used a statement from Clifford Geertz (1973) that gave him an idea for a new model. Geertz claims that “symbolic systems . . . are historically constructed, socially maintained and individually
applied” (ibid.:363-364). With this idea, Rice constructs a four level model that begins with analytical procedures (Merriam’s model), moves to formative processes (Geertz’s idea), focuses on the goal of musicology, which is “how people make music,” and ends with the goal of the human sciences, which is to understand humankind. (Figure 1) According to Rice, this model is dynamic, interactive, and includes various disciplines.

**Figure 1 – Rice’s Theoretical Model**

![Diagram of Rice’s Theoretical Model]

“Hierarchy of levels in the model” (Rice 1987:477)

Rice’s main emphasis in this model is on the “formative processes” of music: how people historically construct, socially maintain, and individually create music. He uses only the basic parts of Merriam’s model (concepts, behavior, and sound), and summarizes them as the “analytical procedures.” Rice’s goal is to incorporate various disciplines in this model, such as sociology, historical musicology, musicology, and psychology, and to include room for both the “hard” sciences and the social sciences and humanities. Thus the strength of this model is its ability to make room for everybody with the hope of uniting many disciplines in ethnomusicology, but the main weakness is that it
really doesn’t explain anything, either in terms of causes and effects, or in terms of processes or meanings.

**Seeger’s Response to Rice’s Model**

Anthony Seeger does not critique Rice’s Model, but rather comments on Merriam’s model and then questions the validity of models themselves.

First, Rice states that Merriam’s model has been oversimplified, and that “It does not really reflect the complexity of Merriam’s thought or the variety of proposals he makes for studying music”. (Seeger 1987:491)

Second, Seeger points out that in Merriam’s model: “There are no people thinking, performing, and producing music, or even listening to it from within a historical tradition.” (ibid.:492) In Merriam’s time, he was still looking for a universal model that could apply to all cultures. Twenty years later, most ethnomusicologists had given up on that venture, and began studying each culture for its inherent uniqueness.

Third, Merriam’s model does not account for the complexity of a culture. A society consists “of different kinds of groups in complex, and sometimes competitive relationships to one another.” Thus “a single society can have several different ways of thinking, performing, and resulting competing musical forms.” (ibid.)

But Seeger’s main response is to ask “whether it is necessary or desirable to develop a single model for ethnomusicology.” (ibid.:493) He prefers debate, and to have ethnomusicologists share their different perspectives, rather than have them agree on one model or theory. He even says that he prefers questions rather than answers: “I think we should inflame our students with questions, rather than bedazzle or befuddle them with
models for answering them.” (ibid.:494) (Ten years later Seeger proposed the abolition of academic departments.)

Koskoff’s Response to Rice’s Model

Ellen Koskoff, like Anthony Seeger does not critiques Rice’s model, but returns to Merriam’s model and explains its full significance. (Figure 2) The process begins with the sound product which is evaluated by the listener. The listener will then, based on his or her concepts and values of music, judge both the music and the performer. This completes the first cycle. The second cycle begins with the performer, who also judges, with the listener, the music. Both of them will re-evaluate their concepts and values of music. A positive evaluation will reinforce the same musical production, whereas, a negative evaluation will change the performer’s behavior and thus create a new musical sound.

Koskoff argues, along with Seeger, than many have oversimplified Merriam’s model. First of all, Merriam distinguished between the performer and the listener. Both of them critique the musical sound and continually re-evaluate their own concepts of music. Second, Merriam’s model is a dynamic, feedback cycle which includes different types of behavior and concepts. Koskoff argues that before we “remodel” ethnomusicology, we should first understand its foundations. (Koskoff 1987:502)
Harwood’s Response to Rice

Harwood comments not on Rice’s model, but on the sources for his model, particularly Geertz (1973). Harwood suggests that “Perhaps a new ‘paradigm’ is upon us” (Harwood 1987:503) and that we are moving away from Merriam’s ‘process to product’ behavioral perspective and toward an interpretive approach” (ibid.). This is a reflection of the shift from the scientific objectivism to more reflexive, experiential approaches. Geertz has been very influential in this shift.

Geertz: a New Hermeneutic

Clifford Geertz has proposed a new approach to anthropological research in his book *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Both Timothy Rice (1997) and Jeff Todd Titon
(1997) have adopted some of his thought in their research. Yet not all ethnomusicologists have accepted these ideas.²

Geertz challenges the validity of the scientific, objective worldview and proposes another in its place. He states, “Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.” (Geertz 1973:5) For Geertz, culture is not a set of abstract ideas in people’s minds. It is the sum of social interaction that has already taken place. Yet the traditional definition is quite different. Culture is “whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members” (Goodenough quoted in Geertz 1973:11). This leads to a description of a society’s rules and norms which if followed would allow one to become “native.” (ibid.) Yet for Geertz, culture is public. “It does not exist in someone’s head.” (ibid.:10) There is a big difference in searching for abstract ideas versus seeking to understand people.

Geertz challenges many assumptions of scientific inquiry. The first is that we can never fully understand everything. Nor can one person fully understand another. This does not prevent us from understanding something of others, but it does deny that science will be able to explain everything in the world and solve all the problems of the world.

The second is that human behavior cannot be reduced to universal principles.

To set forth symmetrical crystals of significance, purified of the material complexity in which they were located, and then attribute their existence to autogenous principles of order, universal properties of the human mind … is to pretend a science that does not exist and imagine a reality that cannot be found (Geertz 1973:20)

² Nettl’s *Excursions in World Music* does not reflect most of the thoughts dealt with in this paper.
If culture is a set of abstract ideas in people’s minds, the goal is to discover these principles and fit them into universal laws. Yet if culture is defined as “socially created significance” (ibid.:12), the goal is to discover meaning and place it in an intelligible framework. Another way to say this is that science is summing data into principles while cultural analysis is putting meanings into a system. In Geertz’s own words: “Rather than beginning with a set of observations and attempting to subsume them under a governing law, such inference beings with a set of (presumptive) signifiers and attempts to place them within an intelligible frame.” (ibid.:26) The goal is not to predict human behavior, but to understand the meaning of it.

Geertz’s third challenge is that science never really explains anything. It only gives us an outline of phenomena. The difference is in the methodology. Rather than be “exact,” we have to “guess.”

Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses, not discovering the Continent of Meaning and mapping out its bodiless landscape.” (ibid.:20)

How does this affect ethnomusicological theory? In the days of comparative musicology, most ethnomusicologists were looking for universal laws: the origin of music, and principles that applied to all musics. This came from a scientific world view. Geertz is challenging this view and saying that we are trying to understand meaning, going as deep as possible in each study. For an ethnomusicologist, this means getting away from the idea of collecting data on the field, analyzing it off the field, and writing up concluding principles into an abstract theory. Geertz’s idea is to get to know the people and try to understand why they do what they do. We cannot define people’s
behavior in terms of universal principles, because people are not logical machines. They are creative, unpredictable human beings. We are not studying rats in a laboratory. We are studying humans in “the informal logic of actual life.” (ibid.:17)

These thoughts influenced Jeff Titon to switch from studying the relationship between music and culture (Merriam’s theory) to studying people making music. The problem with this is that “people making music” involves personal experience, and traditionally, the scientific and academic worlds have no place for “experience” in their way of thinking. For them, it is “subjective,” and, as Merriam implies, any worthy investigation must be “objective:” “ethnomusicology aims to approximate the methods of science.” (Merriam 1964:37) But this debate began years ago.
SEEDS OF CHANGE

In the 1960s, ethnomusicologists debated over whether ethnomusicology should be defined as musicology, anthropology, or some combination of the two. In the 1990s, the debate has switched to whether ethnomusicologists write “objective” ethnographies or rather seek to be “enlightened” by a new musical experience.

Myers: Historical Review

What has happened in thirty years of ethnomusicological activity? According to Myers (1993), the Society for Ethnomusicology was founded in 1955, and within the next five years, American ethnomusicologists had formed two different groups: those with anthropological backgrounds, led by Alan Merriam, and those with musicological backgrounds, led by Mantle Hood. In the 1960s, Merriam proposed the study of music as culture. Myers summarizes the next decades:

The 1970s and 1980s saw a unification in ethnomusicological theory and method despite a diversification of topics. Anthropological and musicological concerns fused; interest shifted from pieces of music to processes of musical creation and performance … and the focus shifted from collection of repertory to examination of these processes. . . Beginning in the 1980s, the biology of music-making united ethnomusicologists with musicologist, performer and music educators, as well as psychologist and neurologists. (Myers 1993:7-10)

Yet although Myers describes the field as uniting, many issues still divide ethnomusicologists.

Conflicts continue: between scholars searching for universally applicable systems of analysis and those attempting to use the cognitive framework of a particular culture as the basis for analysis of its music; between those
who believe that detailed analysis of music leads to understanding and those who believe that music can be understood only on its own terms through performance (Myers 1993:11).

One issue Myers mentions is that of “reflexivity.” Ethnomusicologists have come to realize that just the fact of studying a group influences the group’s behavior, and that no ethnography can avoid including the researcher’s personal interpretation. So is it possible to be “objective”? Myers suggests that these reflexions “will lead us to abandon hope of a false objectivity, and to become resigned to our wholesome subjectivity” (ibid.:12). If this is so, will we be able to accept it as “academically worthy”?

**Titon: Four Paradigms**

Titon (1997) views the history of ethnomusicology as passing through three different paradigms and now arriving at a fourth. The first was comparative musicology which then passed into what Titon calls “musical folklore.” In the 1950s, the field shifted to what we now call “ethnomusicology” with its emphasis on fieldwork and ethnographies. The fourth phase is still coming into being. Titon names it “the study of people making or experiencing music” (Titon 1997:91) with an emphasis on understanding rather than explaining.³ It is obviously Jeff Titon’s interpretation of the times, for it is directly from his research findings and conclusions. Yet the seeds of his thought have been around for quite some time.

**Chase: Objectivity is Impossible**

³ This will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.
Chase (1958) questioned scientific objectivity in the first article of the first bound issue of Ethnomusicology. He mentioned the “epistemological problem of knowledge” and made reference to the influence of the researcher in interpreting the collected data. “Only we … can decide what answer, out of several that might be possible, should in a given instance be set down as the ‘right’ answer” (Chase 1958:1). He is saying that “objectivity” is impossible. He also advocated emotions and subjectivity in research (ibid:5). This article is an example of how at least one ethnomusicologist was challenging a basic assumption of traditional research more than thirty years ago.

**Gourlay: New Approaches**

Gourlay (1978) challenges the same basic principle that Chase did twenty years earlier: Is it possible for a researcher to be objective? Gourlay begins by documenting how many ethnomusicologists insist that research be “objective” and he quotes Nettl, Kaeppler, Herndon, Feld, Merriam, and Lomax. He agrees with Merriam that without objectivity it would impossible to communicate knowledge, but “the difficulty is that the method he [Merriam] propounds to achieve this end involves a concept of the ethnomusicologist as both omniscient and non-existent, as subject to zero constraint and at the same time to absolute constraint” (Gourlay 1978:4). In other words, the researcher never knows nor will know everything; his or her presence has a direct influence on the data and its interpretation; and he or she will always be limited by time, finances, language, politics, relationships, etc.

Recognizing that Merriam’s work in *The Anthropology of Music* has been foundational for ethnomusicology, Gourlay critiques it as being “the logical consequence
of a consistent world view.” (Gourlay 1978:5) Yet “In the 13 years since the publication of *The Anthropology of Music* we have absorbed its general aims and principles and can now view it in perspective as the product of a particular historical world view, which, through its failure to account for all the variables, is now in question.” Merriam’s method had to try to exclude the subjectivity of the investigator, because if it didn’t, it wouldn’t be scientific.

The next phase of Gourlay’s argument is to challenge an almost universal acceptance among anthropologists and ethnomusicologists of “the scientific method.” First of all, he says, we have divided the academic world in two camps: objective and subjective, with no middle ground between them. This leaves us with only two methodological frameworks, yet there must be other options available to us. “In theory there may be other methods of reaching objective results, which, in any total investigation of method, must be considered but which are excluded at the outset by framing the problem in terms of ‘either/or’.” (ibid.:7) Rice, building on Ricoeur’s philosophy, advocates looking for “both/and” options, which he refers to as “mediation.” I will discuss Rice later in this paper.

Second, the scientific method does not take into account all of the variables. Gourlay does not describe what these details are. And lastly, he argues that ethnomusicology needs to develop its own methodology and not import methods randomly from other disciplines. “The analogical reasoning that empirical methods which have produced objective results in the ‘hard’ sciences are equally and directly applicable to the human sciences may or may not be valid” (ibid.). This practices comes from a blind acceptance of the scientific method: “The assumption that there is only one
scientific method results in analogous attempts to apply it in humanistic fields by eliminating the personal and subjective, as in anthropology or sociology, without fully considering whether it is applicable.” (Gourlay 1978:10) The social sciences and humanities need to develop their own methodologies and not assume that the scientific model is naturally appropriate.

Gourlay proposes that what is needed is “a theory which incorporates objective aims with a subjective investigator.” (ibid.:13) He adds that this was addressed by Chase twenty years earlier. Chase (1958) proposed a dialectical method, and although he did not explain it fully, he addressed an important issue: “that many of the conclusions of the researcher are based on what he or she thinks is ‘the right answer’” (Chase 1958:2). But this is considered “subjective” and not “objective.” This begs the question: “Then what is the role of the ethnomusicologist?” Is objectivity possible?

Gourlay recognizes that the ethnomusicologist “answers the questions which he sets himself” (Gourlay 1978:14). This is clearly “subjective” and shows the instructor of the researcher into the research. So what does Gourlay propose?

Gourlay (1978) proposes a “Dialectical Approach.” In this approach, one must accept the apparent contradiction that the researcher is both “outside” the investigation and, at the same time, part of it. Scientific models cannot accept such contradictions, but this “contradiction” model is closer to reality, for “a dialectical approach … accepts contradiction as an aspect of reality itself.” (ibid.:23) Reality is not necessarily “logical.” The researcher, therefore, is both the subject and part of the object of the investigation.

Gourlay then describes the “ethnomusicological process” as three overlapping, continuous phases. The first is the “preparatory period” where the ethnomusicologist is
educated and acculturated within his or her own society. Next is the “research process” where the ethnomusicologist and the music performers are brought together, and the former conducts the “investigation.” Here Gourlay makes an interesting distinction between the Musical Event and the Musical Occasion as opposed to the Research Event and the Research Occasion. In the latter, the researcher is present; in the former, he or she is not. Finally, the ethnomusicologist has to communicate his or her research to an audience, whether it be academic or public. This is the final “presentation process."

This three-phase process would seem obvious to most ethnomusicologists and offers nothing new, as Gourlay admits. But he is emphasizing not the process, but the assumptions behind it, as to whether we can accept the contradiction of the ethnomusicologist being both “inside” and “outside” the investigation; or whether we try to imagine a “purely objective” study where the ethnomusicologist is “removed” from influencing the study. Surely the former is more realistic.

Returning to Rice’s model, proposed in 1987, was he thinking as Gourlay was? I don’t think so, at least not yet. Rice was still trying to reconcile different disciplines with a single model, but within the traditional scientific worldview. The seeds of this new world view for the researcher didn’t come to full expression until Shadows in the Field was published in 1997. Even Rice himself contributed a chapter, completely different from his article published ten years earlier, and a lot closer to Gourlay’s thinking.

**McAllester’s “Experience”**

It takes a long time for a general world view to change, but some ethnomusicologists have been sowing the seeds for several decades. In 1971, David
McAllester wrote a very short article, reflecting on “universals in world music.” He recognizes that “there are probably no absolute ‘universals’ in music.” (McAllester 1971:379) Yet he states that “there are plenty of near-universals” even though this term contradicts itself (ibid.).

Even here it is obvious how McAllester reflects change in ethnomusicological thought. First, he recognizes that music has no universals. At one time, the search for universals drove the whole ethnomusicological enterprise. Also, he can accept a term that contradicts itself! When would an academic discipline accept or even consider contradictions?!

Then he goes through an interesting exercise. He lists several “near-universals:” tonic, tendency, direction, development, and pattern. I note that all of these deal with the music sound. But his last “near-universal” deals with people. He says that “music transforms experience.” It also “takes one away into another state of being.” (ibid.:380) Since when did “experience” (which is considered “subjective”) enter into “academics”?

This article provoked responses by several others (Wachsmann 1971, Seeger 1971, and List 1971), but no one could respond to a proposition of using “experience” in research. In order to deal with “subjectivity” and “experience” in research, ethnomusicologists need a different approach.

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4 Wachsmann (1971) responds to McAllester by talking about contradictions, music itself, heightened experience, and a tetradic schema, and ends by saying that it may not be of universal interest. Seeger (1971) responds by giving an “Outline of a Taxonomy-Hierarchy of the Parameter of Speech Semantic Variance Abstract-Universal-Concept/Concrete-Particular-Percept.” To which George List replies, “I must confess that I rarely understand what his [Seeger] position is,” And in response to the whole discussion of Universals, List concludes, “the principal point of the discussion was that there is no point to it. It is a question that cannot be resolved” (List 1971:399).
Feld rejects the importation of linguistic models into ethnomusicology without critical evaluation of their validity for ethnomusicology. “It is epistemologically silly to assume that linguistic models explain music without some demonstration of why this is the case” (Feld 1974:200). He then goes into a detailed argument that linguistic models are not suitable for ethnomusicology. He adds in his conclusion that linguistic models can only deal with part of ethnomusicology: the music sound. And he sees the need to study not just music itself, but to focus on the question “What does it mean to know a music?” (ibid.:212). Yet the only model he suggests is that of Alan Merriam (1964).

**Herndon: Music is Patterned**

Herndon (1974) attempts to define a model for ethnomusicology. First she complains that few have expressed their ideas in terms of models. Then she groups historical models into four categories: organic, mechanical, process, and mathematical. She implies that ethnomusicologists have turned to the ‘hard’ sciences because of social pressure or popularity.

Then with three basic propositions, she proposes a new model. She assumes music is patterned and can be limited into a musical system which is cognitive. Based on this, her model has four aspects to it: the aesthetic aspect, which states “It is the shared aesthetic boundaries which establish the cultural context of musical systems;” the selection/organization – a particular group establishes sets of sound that are significant and organize them; the learning process – music must be learned, cumulative behavior; and the sound itself which is the aspect most commonly studied (Herndon 1974:246-251).
What Herndon has developed is really a model for making a model, and she admits that she holds to the basic scientific method, and that her basic premise, that music is patterned, is a “dangerous assumption.” I think that because she is still working within the scientific framework which she herself wants to escape, her proposal never received much attention.

**Blum: a Culture of Ideologies**

Blum (1974) argues that behind all theories lies a world view which may or may not be consciously recognized. As ethnomusicologists began to recognize new world views just as they had to deal with new musics, they started coming up with new theories. Dealing with epistemology played a major role in this change. Blum is saying that unless one recognizes his or her world view, one will never be able to break out of it. It will always determine the unchallenged assumptions of one’s research mentality. A group of ethnomusicologists will never challenge their assumptions if by general consensus of their background they are all in agreement. In other words, we develop a culture of ideologies which blinds us to other ways of looking at research. Blum urges “that scholars attempt to formulate in an explicit manner the consequences of their theoretical assumptions and procedures for ‘history’” (Blum 1975:215).

**Seeger’s Dilemma**

Seeger crystalizes one of the problems in ethnomusicological research: “the bulk of what can be said about music lies beyond the limits of (speech) rational discourse”
Words have meanings of their own and when we use them to describe music they add meanings not intended for music (Seeger 1977:180). So how can we talk about music?

Seeger identifies two modes of speech: the reasoned mode and the affective mode. The former deals with “fact;” the latter with values which could be defined as “spiritual.” “All attempts to make speech models of it have failed” (ibid.:183). This is the problem: that musicologists “must concern themselves with both reason and feeling in talking about music” (ibid.). Scientific models are excellent for dealing with reason; but totally inadequate for discussing “feelings,” “inner experience,” “spiritual values.” Scientific method casts a leery eye upon introspection. And the study of the humanself is not a full-fledged scientific one. The actual use of the reasoned mode is still governed by the Aristotelian or formal logic with clearly distinguished universals and particulars, affirmation and negation, and laws of (speech) thought, but with refinements of symbolic logic and communication theory” (ibid.:185).

Also, as Seeger notes, inner experience cannot be verified by others. "One's own self and its feelings are known in a way that the selves and feelings of other people cannot be known. One cannot affirm their existence in the way scientific existence must be affirmed--by the test of other people's agreement” (ibid.). This dilemma plagues ethnomusicologists and Seeger only brings the problem to light without finding a solution to it.

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Merriam: Defining Ethnomusicology

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5 Herndon coined this as “Seeger’s Dilemma” (Herndon 1974:244).
Merriam (1977) tries to sum up where the field of ethnomusicology stands. His main concern is the resolution of the conflict between the terms “ethnomusicology” and “comparative musicology.” After all, that was the main concern of the field when Kunst coined the former term as redefining the latter. But he mentions another problem that Seeger has been dealing with. In defining music itself, Merriam says, “Perhaps in this case, we are dealing with a concept which does not lend itself to definition in the scientific sense” (Merriam 1977:190). But he ends this point in saying that it “is not of central concern to the present discussion” (ibid.). Yet after discussing at length various definitions of ethnomusicology, and all within the scientific framework, Merriam is forced at the end of the article to recognize that another mindset is gaining popularity among ethnomusicologists. After quoting Nettl, that “Ethnomusicology is the comparative study of musical cultures, particularly as total systems including sound and behavior with the use of field research” (Nettl quoted in Merriam 1974:198), Merriam states, “At the same time, a few definitions have recently appeared which represent either idiosyncratic ideas of what ethnomusicology is, or new directions in which it may be going.” (Merriam 1977:198) I add here that when one has worked within a certain world view for much time, it becomes extremely difficult to accept another. Merriam fears that “ethnomusicology might well be forced into such a definition as ‘the performance and the dissemination of ethnic music’” (Merriam 1975:56). He cannot accept such a definition: “This suggestion goes against my own strong conviction that no field of study can be defined on such a basis” (Merriam 1977:198). Yet he recognizes that many students and professors are concerned “the problems of logical positivism and the scientific method’
(ibid.) and have come up with a new definition of ethnomusicology: “the hermeneutic science of human musical behavior” (Hesler quoted in Merriam 1977).

This leads us to the next chapter of ethnomusicological theory which moves from studying music in culture to studying how people make and experience music.
CHANGING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

List: Redefining Ethnomusicology

George List (1979) finds it necessary to redefine "ethnomusicology." When Kunst coined the term in 1950, he did not mean for it to include Western and popular music. Nowadays, says List, ethnomusicology "encompasses almost any type of human activity that conceivably can be related in some manner to what may be termed music" (List 1979:1). He even admits that "we focus upon the performance of music" (ibid.:2) and not just on the written score. He is still within the scientific framework of data sampling, accuracy in procedures, and objectivity. But years before, "performance" was never considered under "objectivity." Here is a hint of future approaches to music. List is open to the possibility of new approaches, for he states: "Any approach, theoretical framework, or method can be utilized if it proves efficacious." (ibid.:4) The problem is defining the term "efficacious."

McAlester: Ethnomusicology is Changing

McAlester (1979) notes the changing times in the past three decades. More than ever cultures and their musics are changing and mixing, assimilating ideas from each other. He shares three "awakenings." It is interesting to note that in an "academic" journal, an author is basing his ideas on "personal experience." The times certainly are changing!

His first awakening is that in order to study a people's music, one not only has to visit their geographic residence, but also one has to visit radio stations, record stores and
concerts where their music is found. A people's music is not limited to one place, but intertwined with other musics and cultures.

His second awakening is the obvious but it needed to be recognized, that "all music is ethnic music" (McAllester 1979:183). All ethnomusicologists recognized this in theory, but, according to the research literature, "we are still romantics, fascinated by the strange and exotic" (ibid.). This is in part due to the low estime Western cultures give to their music and musicians.

The third awakening is that most ethnomusicologists are performers. They want to do the music they study. Hood emphasized "bi-musicality." Many now are "poly-musical." Even science, including ethnomusicology, if we choose to put it in that category, should be an applied science. More on that later.

This constant change in cultures and their intermixing set the stage for a new set of theories. Most ethnomusicological theories up to this point have been aimed at static cultures. (It was unconsciously assumed that cultures were static.) The models themselves have become more dynamic, but the concept of cultures has remained static. If cultures are now seen as dynamic, we will need new models to study them.

But in order to truly change our mindset toward ethnomusicological frameworks, we need to change one more concept: the ethnomusicologist.

**Gourlay: Changing the Ethnomusicologist**

According to Gourlay (1978), who wrote earlier about the ethnomusicologist’s role in research, science has dehumanized the ethnomusicologist. A true "scientific-reductionist-empiricist-objective approach" requires the researcher to collect the data and
then "disappear into it" in order not to bias it (which is impossible) (Gourlay 1982:412).

The case is worse for the study of music, for to be purely scientific, one has to exclude
the aesthetic, because it is "unknowable."

Gourlay's second point is that we have become so "academic" that we spend all
our efforts to study and write and very little to play and compose the very music we
study. "When we can give up ethnomusicologizing and spend our time singing and
dancing the maligned word 'progress' may actually have some meaning" (ibid.:415). He
may be hinting at “applied ethnomusicology.”

His last point may be the most important: How can someone with a particular
world view fully understand someone else with a different one? "The result is inevitably
an interpretation in terms of the investigator's own culture" (Gourlay 1982:416). As
Wachsmann says, "The methodology of comparison may have been fine in theory, but in
practice, to all intents and purposes it interpreted all music in terms of Western
Experience" (Wachsmann 1982:200). What is the solution? We must recognize that the
investigator is part of his or her own investigation and he or she may change as a result of
it. Maybe we could call it a "cultural exchange." Gourlay says that many
ethnomusicologists experience this, but haven't brought it to "conscious realization." "A
humanizing ethnomusicology seeks to bring the two world views into an interpenetrating
dialectical relationship through which the investigator is himself investigated so that the
process becomes one of re-creation" (Gourlay 1982:416). Can we accept this as
"academics?"

Will we be able to "break out " of the scientific mold? One of Gourlay's
arguments is that to change our mindset we must first recognize it for what it is. "The
methods of the hard sciences . . . arose in particular historical circumstances, may themselves become outdated and, applied to ethnomusicology, can result only in the treatment of persons as things" (Gourlay 1978:10-11). It was during the Enlightenment that men "were among the first to conceive of time as a homogeneous, ongoing, irreversible process" (Gourlay 1982:417). This has shaped our thinking much more than we are aware of it. Many cultures do not think this way. We will never understand their music until we understand their world view and even our own.

Gourlay concludes: "My argument for a humanizing ethnomusicology is, at the practical level, a plea for ... a study whose method ... will be a dialectical movement back and forward betwen our world view and theirs--theirs to understand, ours to explain, a study whose ultimate purpose is the re-creation of ourselves and our society through the supercession of a partial linear-visual view by total apprehension of reality" (ibid.:418). His proposal is a whole new approach to ethnomusicology. We have to examine ourselves to recognize the bias we contribute to every investigation, and to allow ourselves to be investigated by our own study and be changed by it. We may even have to challenge who we think we are in order to make a new advance in today's world.

**Wachsmann: Changes in Musical Experience**

So now we begin to move from "objectivity" not toward "subjectivity" but toward experience. Nothing can be truly "objective" because I am always involved in what I am studying. Therefore my experience is valid. Wachsmann uses this logic in his article on musical experience.
First of all he laments the fact that the individual, human component has been lost in ethnomusicology (Wachsmann 1982:210). Then he builds a model of "musical experience" and illustrates how this experience changes over time. If he had written this article ten years earlier, at the time when McAllester's said “music transforms experience,” they would have laughed at him too!

Wachsmann proposes the validity of individual experience. Investigations have traditionally studied groups. "What can an individual tell us about his own, possibly idiosyncratic, experiencing, and by what rules do we evaluate idiosyncracies as useful or useless topics of study?" (ibid.:201) He takes this one step further to ask: "What can a musician say of his experience of a particular musical event over a number of years?" (ibid.:202) With these two questions forming the assumptions of his model, Wachsmann proposes the study of the factors which change this experience over time. He refers to them as "intrusions." In figure 3, each square represents hearing the same musical performance. The arrows represent “intrusions” or other events in the life of the listener. Over time, the listener will experience the same musical performance differently. Wachsmann attributes this to the “intrusions.” This requires bringing in the discipline of psychology, but the interesting point in this article is the whole emphasis on musical experience which before was considered off-limits to science.

Figure 3 Wachsmann’s Model of Intrusion and Musical Experience

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[Diagram of musical experience showing intrusions over time]
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6 This agrees with Gourlay’s arguments (1978 and 1982).
NEW EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROOTS

Two perspectives have dominated ethnomusicologists for some time. The first is scientific objectivity, and the second is Western imperialism. Both of these have resulted in a fieldwork that has consisted of collecting data in the field from cultures other than one’s own and analyzing them in the laboratory according to the Western worldview. Now, Western imperialism is in decline and negatively viewed from other parts of the world. Scientific objectivity has proved worthless in solving the world’s problems and in appreciating other world views. We are now are the verge of a new epistemological age (Cooley 1997)

The former paragraph is the essence of the introduction written by Timothy Cooley in *Shadows in the Field*. He begins with a challenge: “The fieldwork methodology of collecting data to support goals external to the field experience is no longer considered adequate. This model has not been replaced by a single new model or single methodology, but we have entered an experimental moment when new perspectives are needed” (Cooley 1997:11). What has ethnomusicology to offer? Cooley suggests that new ethnomusicological approaches may demonstrate a way to know and understand “that can be achieved only through the experience of human interaction” (ibid.:18). But first we must consider some epistemological foundations.

Ethnomusicologists are searching for new foundations for their theories. At the bottom of any theory in any field is “How can we know what we know?” Most people never go that deep. They just live and work with whatever epistemology they have unconsciously accepted. In *Shadows in the Field*, both Titon (1997) and Rice (1997) search for new epistemological foundations for ethnomusicology. I believe they were both influenced by Geertz, as well as others.

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7 "No inquirer, we maintain, ought to go about the business of inquiry without being clear about just what paradigm informs and guides his or her approach." (Guba and Lincoln 1994:116)
Shadows in the Field is about fieldwork, the heart of ethnomusicology. If ethnomusicologists haven’t been able to agree on any one theory, they do agree on this: “We do fieldwork.” It is this “practical” aspect of ethnomusicology that keeps all its participants in touch with reality, and keeps them looking for models and approaches that remain true to that reality. Titon and Rice are two of these pilgrims who, as a result of their respective experiences in the Appalachian Mountains and Bulgaria, have developed new approaches to the field. They do not coincide, for they take different approaches to the issue. Titon (1997) proposes a new model: that we study “people making music.” He also proposes a new ontology: to ground musical knowledge in musical being. Whereas Rice (1997) doesn’t propose a model.\(^8\) He proposes a “mediation” approach to model-making. Both make us take a whole new look at ethnomusicology.

**Titon: A Performance Model**

Jeff Titon (1988) began with folklife in a small church in Stanley, Virginia, where he studied the life of a Baptist congregation. He concluded that folklife centers on “affect” which he defines as “the power to move people.” From this he developed a model of “performance.” “Affect is brought into being by performance” (Titon 1988:8). In this case, the performance consisted of the church service. Here, “performance” carries four implications. First, it is intentional, that is, the goal is to move people in specific ways. The performance is not just for “listening” or “entertaining,” but is meant to produce a reaction in the audience.

The second implication of performance is that it is “rule-governed.” It is not “a random event,” but has definite procedures that are followed for its execution. Sometimes

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\(^8\) He came out with one later in 2003.
people can tell you what the rules are, other times they cannot express it in words. This takes us back to “Seeger’s Dilemma:” How can we use words to express music? Yet what Titon realizes here is another question: “How can someone ‘know’ something, if they cannot express it in words? Do they really ‘know’?”

Thirdly, performance is always “interpreted.” It is interpreted by both the performers and the audience. By “sharing knowledge and understanding, performers … determine the meaning and significance of the performance” (Titon 1988:9). This interpretation leads into evaluation which affects the performance. This aspect of feedback closely resembles Merriam’s model, the difference being the context. Merriam was working with a “culture” framework. Titon is using “performance” as his study unit which is much smaller and more defined than Merriam’s.

Yet there is a deeper different between the two. Using Geertz’s philosophical framework, Merriam was searching for a model that would be applicable to all cultures, whereas Titon developed a model that gave meaning to what he was experiencing in Stanley, Virginia. The models appear to be the same, yet their foundations are worlds apart.

Lastly, performance is marked. There is a definite beginning and end. It does not happen all the time, continuously. Performance is an aspect of life, but it is not all of life.

As a result his experience in Stanley, Virginia, Titon (1988) developed a model of performance which was originally developed to explain folklife (Figure 4). Affect is situated within performance which is within a community. Titon wants to emphasize a holistic approach to music by stressing that music takes place within a community

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9 Often there is no distinction between the two.
setting. Music is not an individual event. A musical performance takes place with a group of persons. Also, the musical event does not disappear. It remains in the memory of the members of the community.

Figure 4 Titon’s Model of Folk Performance

![Figure 4 Titon’s Model of Folk Performance](image)

“A model for folklife studies” (Titon 1988:11)

Titon (2004) later adapted the model to explain musical performance. Music is the center of any performance by musicians, which takes place within a community setting, which occurs at a specific time in history. (Figure 5)

Figure 5 Titon’s Adapted Model for Musical Performance

![Figure 5 Titon’s Adapted Model for Musical Performance](image)

“Elements of a musical performance” (Titon 2002:16)
Titon: Dialogue to Knowing

Titon (1988) also began to question the validity of the folklorist (the traditional word is “the outsider”) interpreting the meaning of the event for the folk (the “insider”).\(^9\) Titon terms this “the analogical interpretative tradition,” giving Tedlock (1983) credit for the idea: “the anthropologist, after collecting these performed texts and native interpretations, simply replaces them with his or her own claims about what is ‘really’ happening. Thus folklorist claims, implicitly, to ‘know more’ than the folk; he or she has had a scientific education and can see their behavior ‘objectively’”(Titon 1988:12). Titon agrees with Tedlock that the analogical traditions “are not faithful to the phenomenon of understanding as it occurs” (ibid.:13). The folklorist is not really understanding the folk. He or she is understanding “the differences between two worlds” (ibid.). During the investigation, which Titon now calls “the dialogue,” the two begin a conversation in which understanding takes place, not of “them,” but of the “intersubjective reality” between the two. The dialogue never ends. Ever time one “returns” to the field, is it not to verify conclusions, but to deepen understanding by dialoging further.

Titon (1997a) proposes a new epistemology for ethnomusicology. He expresses it as the difference between “explaining” and “understanding” as held by “Continental European Philosophy.” “Explanation is typical in the sciences, and understanding typifies knowledge in the humanities” (Titon 1997a:89).\(^{10}\) As I mentioned before in this

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\(^9\) This is what Gourlay (1978) had questioned ten years earlier.

\(^{10}\) The English language has difficulty expressing these two types of knowledge proposed by Titon (1997a): “knowledge that” and “knowledge of.” For those with a knowledge of Spanish, that difficulty is surpassed. The Spanish language has two different verbs for the English “to know,” (as does Greek). These are “saber” and “conocer.” “Saber” refers to cognitive knowledge or Titon’s “knowledge that.” We might say this knowledge is impersonal and distant. “Conocer” refers to personal, experiential knowledge. The different might be illustrated by the two comments: “I know Paris because I have read all about it;” and “I know Paris, because I have been there.” For Gourlay (1978), the scientific “objective” model tried to remove the researcher from the research and obtain “saber” knowledge. Gourlay (1978) and Titon
paper, sciences deals with hypotheses, collecting data, and universals laws, and studies things. The humanities on the other hand, deal with people. And the goal is “understanding through interpretation” (Titon 1997a:89).

What has happened to ethnomusicology is that it has previously adapted mostly scientific models. Titon argues that the most influential theories in ethnomusicology came from linguistics which lends itself readily to science investigation. Anthropology also has greatly influenced ethnomusicology.

Titon’s proposal here, then, is to consider another philosophical basis for knowledge and apply it to ethnomusicological theory. Titon wants to integrate phenomenology and hermeneutics into one. According to Titon (1997a), phenomenology “attempts to ground knowledge in the world of lived experience” (ibid:90); and hermeneutics “has come to be a method for interpreting texts in general” (ibid.). Thus hermeneutic phenomenology is “any meaningful action can be considered, or read, as a text” (ibid.).

Titon doesn’t think this is the best way to proceed in ethnomusicology. Rather, he proposes “that we stand Ricoeur on his head, that meaningful actions be experienced as music, not read as text.” (ibid.) In Titon’s own words this translates to “The world is not

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11 This is what Geertz (1973) explains in his first chapter of *The Interpretation of Cultures*.

12 Geertz (1973) greatly influenced Titon (1997) and Rice (1997).

13 Merriam’s comment on “sciencing about music” was a proposal to include humanistic theories in ethnomusicology, but in Merriam’s day, science was predominant and no one accepted or fully understood his idea.

14 Paul Ricoeur (1981) calls this “hermeneutic phenomenology.”
like a text to be read but like a musical performance to be experienced.” Sadly he leaves further explanation of this “for a future essay” (Titon 1997a:91).

I would comment that Titon is proposing an approach unique to ethnomusicology. Further on he says that, “I would like to ground musical knowing—that is, knowledge of or about music—in musical being. . . . Another way of saying this is that I ground musical knowledge in the practice of music, not in the practice of science, or linguistics, or introspective analysis.” (ibid.:94) I understand this to mean that one has to be directly involved in the musical performance, either as listener or performer, in order to understand it.

Titon (1997a) also uses the phrase “being-in-the-world.” Rice (1997) explains this concept more fully than Titon. Cartesian philosophy begins by doubting. The phase, “I doubt, therefore, I am” establishes the significance of the “ego” which doubts the existence of everything else. Only by “investigation” can the “ego” “prove” that the world exists. Thus the “ego” is “sovereign” and determines the validity of the world it observes. This has been the philosophical basis of scientific, objective investigation. For most people it has been an unconscious assumption.

On the other hand, if we begin with the philosopher Descartes, he starts with the philosophical basis that the “ego” has been “thrown into the world,” the world exists as a given, and the “ego” has to interact with the world in order to establish its own identity. Thus we have a completely different basis for “obtaining knowledge.” This will directly affect how an ethnomusicologist goes about fieldwork. A researcher with a Cartesian philosophical base will try to test hypotheses, whereas another with a Descartian
philosophy will first seek to understand and then build a framework for that understanding.

Titon refers to “being-in-the-world” as the starting point of phenomenological hermeneutics. But he takes it one step further. He is applying this philosophy to the musical world. In order to understand music, one has to approach it from a “non-scientific” viewpoint. One does not simply “study” musical performance. One interacts with it; dialogues with it; changes it; and is changed by it. One of the most important aspects of fieldwork are the relationships one develops with the people one works with. “Fieldwork is intersubjective and personally transformative . . . If we believe that knowledge is experiential and the intersubjective product of our social interactions, then what we can know arises out of our relations with others” (Titon 1997a:94,95).

This is a completely different method from the “objective” approach where the researcher did everything possible not to “influence” the data. Here, Titon is advocating not only involvement, but developing relationships during the study. To a scientist, it would seem like a purely “emotional adventure.” But Titon is approaching it from a completely different world view. I ask, “Will this be acceptable in ‘academic’ circles and institutions? How can these ideas be expressed in terms of models?”

Michelle Kisliuk (1997) encountered this issue during her fieldwork among the BaAka pygmies in the Central African Republic. She did not want to “influence” the results, yet she found herself becoming part of the people she was studying, and her own life being changed by them. Her conclusion is that “The renewed emphasis on experience is part of a continuing seachange in the humanities that is moving us toward reflexive,
nonobjectivist scholarship (and, not by coincidence, distancing us from historically colonialist approaches)” (Kisliuk 1997:23).

**Rice: A Mediation Approach**

Will Titon’s approach of “musical being” replace traditional ethnomusicological practice? Time will tell. But Rice suggests a “mediation” approach.

Rice argues that fieldwork has always been central to ethnomusicology. In fact, the fieldwork experience “constitutes the sine qua non of the state of being an ethnomusicologist” (Rice 1997:105). I think most ethnomusicologists would agree with him on that. He continues arguing that ethnomusicologists, by accepting this fieldwork experience as liminal, have placed the ontological significance over the epistemological significance. In other words, they have emphasized “being there” over “knowing that” (ibid.). Thus, argues Rice, the field experience has become more important than the field method. In fact, “the self is transformed and reconfigured in the act of understanding one’s own or another culture” (ibid.).

The human tendency is to go from one extreme to another, like a pendulum swinging back and forth. Sometimes it is necessary to go to one extreme in order to escape from the other, but eventually we need to settle down somewhere in between. Rice attempts to do this, suggesting that rather than make a “either/or” issue out of these approaches, we enter with a “both/and” attitude and look for how to use the best of both. As Rice himself explains: “In this chapter I have exposed a number of oppositions: studies of music “in its own terms” versus music as culture; explanations based on methods versus understandings based on experience; and insiders and outsiders. I have
held out the hope for some sort of mediation, rather than a choice, between them” (Rice 1997:119).

Rice gets many of his ideas, as does Titon, from Ricoeur (1981) who proposes phenomenological hermeneutics. In fact, he sees Ricoeur as “as master of dialectical thinking” (Rice 1997:117). Rice sees this as a mediation approach between two extremes. The first extreme is experimentation that excludes experience. This is the tradition “objective” approach. The second extreme is to focus on experience and abandon methodology. This is the reaction to our disillusion with positivism (ibid.:119). Rice sees Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics as placing “experiment within the framework created by experience” (ibid.). Usually we have thought of the place of experience within experiment. Rice suggests considering the place of experiment within experience. He explains this in terms of “hermeneutical arcs.” (Another idea he took from Ricoeur.)

**Rice: Hermeneutical Arcs**

The “hermeneutical arc” concept applies to the issue of the “outsider” and the “insider.” The arc concept begins with the concept that the “outsider” is not the researcher studying “the other,” but is one person interacting with another to reach a mutual understanding. We all have our pre-conceived notions, and in this case the “researcher” has had a verbal explanation of some kind of what he or she is about to study. He or she approaches the investigation with the attitude that only in the experience of interacting will understanding begin. This applies not only to scholars, but to everyone.

“All individuals operating within tradition continually reappropriate their cultural

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15 Myers (1993) recognizes these problems, but doesn’t propose any solution.
16 Titon (1988:13) argued that the first can never really understand the second; he or she can only understand the difference between them.
practices, give them new meanings, and in that process create a continually evolving sense of self, of identity, of community, and of ‘being in the world’” (Rice 1997:117).

Finally, these arcs circle back through explanation to new understanding. We are continually “explaining,” “understanding,” “explaining,” and “understanding.” The cycle never ends; it only deepens. This could be likened to “deepening a friendship.” We know more and more as we spend time together, but we never know each other fully.

**Communicating the Results**

Is ethnomusicology experiencing a paradigm shift? Barz suggests that in the field, ethnomusicologists have shifted for quite some time, but their writing does not reflect the change. “Much of the focus in ethnomusicological writing and teaching until now has centered around analyses and ethnographic representations of musical cultures instead of on the rather personal world of the understanding, experience, knowing, and doing of fieldwork.” (Barz 1997:205) The whole issue centers on how to represent field experiences in the academic world. No one has found a satisfactory answer since Seeger first proposed the problem in 1971. Seeger himself proposed a solution to this problem by bringing accomplished musicians from other parts of the world to UCLA (Myer 1993:7). Barz comments, “If there was an adequate or acceptable way of “music-ing” or performing our ethnography within this volume I am sure that many authors included here would embrace it” (Barz 1997:206).

Titon deals with the issue of how to communicate what one has learned to his or her colleagues back at the university. Since no one has resolved “Seeger’s Dilemma,”

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17 Merriam (1964) described this concept of feedback in his model, only in a different context. Gourlay (1978:22) described this same process in his dialectical approach.
Titon proposes three ways to communicate knowledge: “narrative musical ethnography, ethnographic film, and hypertext/multimedia” (Titon 1997:96). The first is the traditional way, although it is changing. Ethnographies are becoming more reflexive, although the “confessional” mode is being frowned upon. Geertz points out that we are primarily authors, not reporters (ibid.). Ethnographic films are useful if they’re produced to represent the “real thing,” and not made to imitate Hollywood.

The third is a new option that will take time for its evaluation, probably a generation. The whole idea of hypertext is only possible with computers and Internet which have only been popular for the past twenty-five years. But the idea is consistent with the model Titon proposes: we learn by interacting with what we are studying.

Overall, ethnomusicology is changing. It is difficult to tell where it will go.
THE FUTURE OF ETHNOMUSICOLOGY

So now we’re back to where we began: to a discipline that lacks definition, direction, and consensus among its members. So much so that Kingsbury (1997) proposed that the field should be abolished. What exactly did he mean? His intent was to provoke discussion and thought just as Feld (1974) did years before. He suggests that ethnomusicology has not kept up to date, and that Titon’s definition of culture as “a people’s total way of life” belong to the time of Ulysses S. Grant and that Seeger’s use of “our notion of a piece of music” assumes that we all think like him. Kingsbury accomplished his goal, and Titon and Seeger both responded to his article. But Kingsbury’s main argument was to suggest that ethnomusicology has only applied to non-Western musics. “I do fear that ‘ethnomusicology’ has come to represent the institutionalization of an epistemological double standard: examination of the social interaction which generates musical experience is specific to the study of ‘other’ musics” (Kingsbury 1997:248). In order to include all musics, he suggests that ethnomusicology should be renamed “sociomusicology.”

Seeger (1997) responds to Kingsbury that ethnomusicology should be abolished! But he approaches the question from a completely different angle. He wants to abolish “the entire structure of academic disciplines” (Seeger 1997:250). This is his point: we have become so specialized that in order to fully address a problem we have to use “interdisciplinary approaches.” Rather we should focus on questions and invite everyone who can make a contribution to work with us. We have become so focused on different disciplines that each one has its own vocabulary which prevents them from understanding another. In these few articles of “call and response” that is exactly what happens.
Kingbury criticizes the vocabulary of Rice, then Titon and Kingbury find themselves “talking past one another” (Kingsbury 1997:259).

Titon, in order to answer Kingsbury, summarizes the issues at hand: first, the conflict between the sciences and the humanities. Since Alan Merriam’s *The Anthropology of Music* we have been “confronting the paradox that our subject was art but our method science” (Titon 1997b:253). Second, that the definition of culture as “the was of life of a people” is still held by many today. Third, that the concept of “cultural holism” is relevant today in a postmodern world, even though that concept first originated in the nineteenth-century. And finally, that we have progressed from Merriam’s “sciencing about music” to “knowing people making music.” Did Titon address Kingsbury concern of including Western music in ethnomusicology? No. That’s the problem. They are really talking about two different issues.

Should ethnomusicology continue? Keil argues that it is about to die, because it really doesn’t produce anything worthwhile, at least not all this “gobbledigook” that Kingsbury refers to. Keil’s call is “for ethnomusicologists to become performance theorists and applied sociomusicologists in addition to doing ever better ethnomusicology” (Keil 1998:305). He argues that we need to produce, in the end, something practical that people can use: music.18 In the meantime, he continues, performance studies may provide a solution to combine theory and practice.

Performance studies promises to reclaim Burke’s dramatism, refocuses attention on world-as-event rather than world-as-view, urges us to enact our beliefs and see what knowledge emerges from the enactment, asks ontological as well as epistemological questions, and can help us playfully put the arts back together again for community-serving purposes (ibid.:308).

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18 He has been advocating this for many years: “This applied ethnomusicology has been urgently needed for decades” (Keil 1982:408).
Keil (1998) tries to put the discussion among Kingbury (1997), Titon (1997), and Seeger (1997) on a positive route. We need to avoid what Kingsbury calls “gobbledigook” (Kingsbury 1997:248). (I interpret that to mean “worthless discussions.”) He agrees with Titon’s goals of “holism, finding patterns that connect, knowing people making music, getting past the self/other dicotomies” and Seeger’s suggestion to focus on questions rather than departmental structures, and urges “applied sociomusicology”—getting people to make music that will enhance their lives.

I would offer a reflection here that the most advanced disciplines are those that began with an urgent problem to solve, not with a desire for more knowledge. Take medicine for example. There is still much to be known about the human body, but thanks to medicine we are much healthier today that generations before. I think Keil is arguing along the same lines. If ethnomusicology focused on how to use music to enrich human life and experience, we wouldn’t be tied up in so many debates over definitions and method.

Kisliuk (1998) takes the argument one step further. How long will we maintain the boundaries between scholarship and art, “boundaries that have been set up within Euro-American academia—which has its own distinct institutional history linked to the development of the imperialist/rationalist world?” (Kisliuk 1998:313) Ethnomusicology itself is heading for extinction because 1) we can no longer study music without study all the other aspects of life of which it is a part; 2) the word “ethno” no longer means anything, since we all are “ethno” and other cultural factors distinguish groups such as age, class, politics, gender, etc; 3) the concept of “ology” (which implies scientific objectivity) is “linked to a colonialist/patriarchal mentality. For Kisliuk, performance
studies is a developing model that will help us “to move toward a fully transdisciplinary, transgeneric, interactive, embodied scholarship.” (Kisliuk 1998:314)

Keil and Kisliuk are not alone. Wong also advocates an applied ethnomusicology. She warns that while we cannot abandon theory, the real need of the day is something practical. We need to learn “how to turn critical thought into social action” (Wong 1998:318).

Davis advocates “for a unity and equity between theory and practice in ethnomusicology” (Davis 1992:364). She refers to Merriam who asked the question of whether “one is searching out knowledge for its own sake, or is attempting to provide solutions to applied practical problems” (Merriam 1964:42-43) and answers that both are necessary. “Science” has the tendency to promote theory as superior to application. Such is the case that those who cannot find jobs in academic institutions “take the leftovers” and do the practical work. (Note how a Ph.D. has more status than a D. Miss.) Also, in academic institutions more reward is given for publications that for applied projects (Davis 1992:367). Davis states that the whole basis of the scientific method was “learning by doing.” She defines this as “learning theoretical principles through the practical experience of experimentation” (ibid.:365). We need to return to “applied ethnomusicology.” As Sheehy say, “Applied ethnomusicology is perhaps most observable as an implacable tendency first to see opportunities for a better life for others through the use of music knowledge, and then immediately to begin devising cultural strategies to achieve those ends” (Sheehy 1992:324).
RECENT MODELS

The debate continues: scientific objectivity vs experiencial reflexivity; theory vs practice; models vs fieldwork; and some who say we need to integrate the best of each. I note that very few have dealt with the question: “Where is the Western world historically?” Herndon (1974) mentioned how each generation asks different questions. What questions is Western society asking? Are ethnomusicologists dealing with those questions or are they lost in debate among themselves?

Porcello: Musical Experience is Curved and Individual

New ideas emerge every year. Porcello (1998) has one of them, as he proposes that musical experience is not linear, but curved.19 His inspiration was Albert Einstein who argued that space is not linear, but curved. Einstein’s argument is way beyond the scope of this paper, but Porcello illustrates the concept very well by likening it to a reel of tape as it is wound. Musical technicians have long known that the magnetic recording on one section of tape can pass to another section it is touching when it is wound. This is known as “print-through.” The result is that one can hear faintly, on a tape that has been stored for some time, a pre-echo of what one is about to hear. Thus, as one listens to music on a reel tape, one can experience past, present, and future at the same time: the past is still in one’s memory; the pre-echo gives one an anticipation of the future; and the present is the loudest audible sound.

I appreciate this illustration, because many have mentioned that music should be studied in its full context. Usually this is meant to include location, setting, performers,

19 Gourlay proposed that linear or chronological thinking has limited us for centuries. “We are just beginning to become aware of the limitations of the chronological view and the degree to which our historical thinking is shaped by it” (Vicent Duckles quoted in Gourlay 1982:417).
audience, etc., but what about the context of “past” and “future?” What performances have occurred before, and what performances are anticipated in the future? Sportscasters and politicians are experts at this. Why not ethnomusicologists? Titon (1997) and Rice (2003) both use time as history in their models, but not as fully as Porcello.

Another important point of Porcello’s article is that of personal experience. He is describing the recording of music in a professional studio. Three people are present: the musician, the technician, and himself, the researcher. All are in the same place at the same time. Each one is processing past, present, and future in a very different way. The musician is concerned about the musical sound. The technician is concerned about his recording equipment. And the researcher is mulling over the meaning of the whole event. Each one of them experiences and processes the week of recording in a different way. So, I ask, how are we ever going to develop a theory or model that explains everyone’s experience of the musical performance?

**Turino: Semiotics and Emotions**

Thomas Turino proposes another model. He says, “It seems to me that the challenge for the next generation is to develop a theory of music in relation to what is usually called ‘emotions’—our inadequate gloss for that mammoth realm of human experience that falls outside language-based thinking and communication” (Turino 1999:221). This is an interesting article because Turino is trying to build a model to deal with emotions. This is an attempt to describe subjectivity using objectivity; if we look at it from the traditional viewpoint. Turino will base his approach on semiotics, and construct a triangle model among sign, object, and interpretant. (Figure 6) Without going
into the details of the model\textsuperscript{20}, it is interesting to note that after reviewing postmodern approaches as proposed by Titon (1997), and Rice (1997), and summarizing a debate over the future of ethnomusicology and academic disciplines (Kingsbury 1997 and Seeger 1997), one still finds articles (in the same journal) whose philosophical base is the same as those of thirty years before. Turino is not addressing the questions of the past, but he is using the methods of the past, and thus his approach is very theoretical and far removed from the present fieldwork approach.

\textbf{Figure 6 Turino’s Triangular Model}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{turino_model.png}
\end{figure}

Yet I do appreciate one of his ideas. He suggests that music “brings to memory” experiences that one could not remember through words.\textsuperscript{21} “The fact that certain parts of ourselves are only available through pre-symbolic signs is precisely why we need art and music, media that operate largely at the iconic and indexical levels” (Turino 1999:244).

\textsuperscript{20} Turino’s model is much too complex to deal with in this paper.
\textsuperscript{21} This concept was suggested by Blacking: “Music cannot express anything extramusical unless the experience to which it refers already exists in the mind of the listener” (Blacking 1995:35).
Thus, we need music “to achieve subjective integration of the whole person.” We are headed back to “applied ethnomusicology.”

**Rice: Plotting Individual Musical Experience**

The lastest attempt to form a model for ethnomusicology is by Timothy Rice (2003). Rice begins with the perspective that the world we live in today is not the same as the world forty years ago. We are asking new questions and need new answers. Rice acknowledges the need for a new theoretical framework for ethnomusicology. Surprisingly he does not mention his model proposed in 1987 as the model that needs to be renewed. He returns to Alan Merriam (1964) as the framework that “still usefully guides a significant portion of our research, even as we have moved beyond the oversimplified view of the world that it supports” (Rice 2003:151). According to Rice, Merriam’s world was “a relatively simple world of bounded, isolated, shared cultures and relatively static social structures” (ibid.). Today’s world just the opposite: “a complex of unbounded, interacting cultures” (ibid.).

Rice also admits that the world may not have changed, and what has changed may be our view of it. But either way, we need a new model. The basis of Rice’s new model is the individual or small groups. The reason for this is that large group are so fluctuating that they are hard to define. So we have to study smaller units. He uses the theoretical basis I have been discussing in this paper of people experiencing music rather than the old theoretical basis of studying music in culture. The main question he seeks to answer is: “How do individuals experience music in modernity, in modern life, in the modern
world system?” (Rice 2003:152) He calls this “subject-centered musical ethnography” which takes place in a proposed “three-dimensional space of musical experience” (ibid). He qualifies this by emphasizing the difference between studying the music itself and the experience of that music (ibid.:154). This seems to me to go back to the old debate of whether ethnomusicology will follow a scientific or a humanistic approach in its research. Here Rice is following the later, although he would like to find some “synthesis” of the two. This was his proposal in 1997.

The danger of doing these “self-centered ethnographies” is that of doing merely individual biographies. But Rice proposes comparing these individual ethnographies as “different subject positions but interacting in time and space” (ibid.:157). One definition is necessary here. Rice defines experience as one’s interaction with the world and others. It “is not an inner phenomenon accessible only via introspection to the one having the experience” (ibid.). Thus the research is not trying to “get into the mind” of others, but he or she is observing their interaction with others and with the world. This concept follows from Geertz’s concept of culture being “public” and not “in the minds of people.”

**Figure 7 Rice’s Three-Dimensional Model**

“A three-dimensional space of musical experience and ethnography” (Rice 2003:158).
With these conceptual frameworks, Rice proposes “plotting” a person’s multiple experiences on a three-dimensional graph. (Figures 7 & 8) The first axis is time, not necessarily chronological time, but also experiential time. The second axis is location, which is not just physical location, but “social settings” in which a person may encounter several in one day. The third axis is different metaphors or meanings of music. Thus a person in a certain social setting, at a certain point in his or her life, will experience music and give it a certain meaning. Rice then proposes using the graph to illustrate “movement” between different musical experiences with the hope of then comparing experiences across individuals.

This is an excellent attempt to reconcile the post-modern approach with the modern approach. Rice’s model tries to use an experiential approach with all its assumptions I have already explained and position it within a mathematical representation.
Andrew Killick supports Rice’s new model. He adds that it is the second time Rice has proposed a “remodeling of ethnomusicology.” His personal opinion of ethnomusicology is that “we have long since lost the blueprints” (Killick 2003:180), and some ethnomusicologists (Lieberman 1977; Kingsbury 1997) have even proposed that “the entire building ought to be condemned and razed to the ground” (Killick 2003:180). So a unifying framework for ethnomusicology is welcome.

Killick warns that the danger of Rice’s new model is to use it only for individual ethnographies and never reach the point of daring to compare those studies with each other. “Some have consciously attempted to produce such microstudies, but few have ventured actual comparisons between them” (ibid.:181). His article is a comparison of three genres from Korea in which he uses Rice’s model to compare them. According to Killick, the usefulness of Rice’s model “lies in its capacity for framing inductive generalizations and hypotheses as to which routes through the three-dimensional space tend to be more traveled than others, and why” (ibid.:182). His hope is that we will return to comparing musical cultures with one another. I ask, “Have we come full circle and returned to “comparative musicology?”
CONCLUSIONS

The past fifty years of ethnomusicological thought have shown tremendous change and a continuing lack of consensus. It seems like ethnomusicologists “know” there is something out there worth studying, but they cannot define it or decide how to approach it.

One of the reasons for this is the epistemological shift of ethnomusicological research. And until ethnomusicologists agree on a single epistemological framework, they will always disagree on theories and methods.

Another problem is the lack of a solution for how to represent fieldwork to one’s colleagues. Ever since Seeger (1977) proposed his “Dilemma” no one has found an acceptable way to “talk” about music. “Writing” will probably continue for a long time yet.

The proposed methodological approach is two-fold. First, to use “performance studies” as the basis for further ethnomusicological investigation. The basic framework is expressed by Bonnie Wade’s: “people make music meaningful and useful in their lives” (Wade 2004:1). Ethnomusicologists have proposed a subject-experience oriented, reflexive approach they will begin to use. Time and experience will reveal the results.

The second aspect is to begin applying ethnomusicology to real life problems. This will make the theories more valid and keep them in touch with reality. It will also prevent much writing about “goobledigook” and hopefully give us more enriched and fuller lives.
Finally, there are three areas that were not explored at all in this paper. The first is Witzleben’s proposal to draw methodological inspirations from non-Western cultures’ traditions (Witzleben 1997:230). Most of our theories and methods come from Western traditions. What if ethnomusicologists allowed non-Western traditions to have a voice in developing new theories and approaches for ethnomusicology?

Secondly, Chiener describes a new fieldwork situation. Normally, an ethnomusicologist learns music at home, and then “goes out to the field” to do research. Chiener has experienced the opposite: “those of us who carry out research at home and who have learnt music outside formal fieldwork contexts” (Chiener 2002:457). What are the implications of this situation?

The third area is very important to consider in using performance studies. Downey argues that hearing music is cultural learned. Therefore ethnomusicologist need to focus on the learning process of hearing before they can “interpret” the music they are studying (Downey 2002:490). He was also influenced by Geertz’s thinking, but all of this should be dealt with in another paper.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MISSIOLOGY

Models: Merriam and Titon

The two models that are most useful for missiology are those of Merriam (1964) and Titon (2002) because of their simplicity and profound insights.

Merriam’s model states that human behavior is based on a person’s values. The concepts one holds determine one’s behavior, especially the music one chooses, composes, and experiences. The reverse of this is that music will reveal one’s values. Missiologists are ultimately concerned with people’s values and beliefs. Music can reveal these concepts.

Also, Merriam’s model suggests constant feedback and change in both the music sound and the concepts about music. We cannot assume that people’s values and music will remain constant. What we study among a people group one year will not necessarily apply next year, nor reflect last year.

Yet both of these concepts reveal the potential of music for changing people’s ideas, not only about music, but about other things as well. Merriam didn’t exactly see it that way. He only saw how people evaluated the music and make judgments about it. For him, the music was being modified by the concepts, nor vice versa. Yet the potential for music changing peoples idea is included in his model.

Titon’s model is very useful for recognizing the influence of context on music. As missiologists study music performances, we need to remember all the factors that are influencing the musical event: the audience, the community, personal relationships both within and without the group, politics, finances, the historical context, even weather. All
of these directly influence what is occurring during the performance. If we are to study music in its context, we must also study these other factors.

Titon’s model is based on affect or the power to influence and change, both the listeners and the performers. Here is where missiologists need to take note. Music is very influential and can be used to change people!

What these models did not touch upon was which music affects which people most. It was assumed that each ethnic group had one type of music which everyone in that group preferred. Yet it may be that different people in the same ethnic group have different musical preferences, and different musics may affect them in different ways. Missiologists need to know which music is most effective in influencing the persons they want to change.

**Paradigms: Positivism, Constructivism, and Divine Revelation**

There’s more to ethnomusicology than models. This paper dealt a lot with the philosophical basis for investigation. Missiologists need to take this into account and be aware of which paradigm of inquiry they are using for their investigations. The scientific worldview was predominant until recently. Geertz (1973) and Gourlay (1978 and 1982) help us understand that the scientific method is not always the best to use, especially when dealing with human behavior. Geertz challenges us to treat people as humans, not as machines. We should try to understand them, rather than analyze them. We are not trying to predict their future behavior, but to understand why they behave the way they do, and ultimately what their values are. How can we advocate new values for them, if we don’t understand what values they already have?
The ultimate challenge of this paper is for missiologists to define their paradigm of inquiry. If we choose between positivism and constructivism, this will result in whether we seek to know “How music functions in culture” (positivism) or “How people experience music” (constructivism). Another option will be to decide between “Developing models to explain behavior” (positivism) or “Developing frameworks of meaning to understand behavior” (constructivism).

Yet I believe that missiologists should develop their own paradigm of inquiry. Both positivism and constructivism deny anything spiritual. Their paradigms are not acceptable or complete from a Biblical point of view. I suggest the need to further investigate the development of a paradigm of inquiry which begins with the following premises: We are created in God's image; we seek to understand what God is presently doing in our world; and we commit ourselves to working with Him. These faith statements are completely compatible with the Guba and Lincoln’s (1994) paradigm outline.

A possible table of comparison between these three paradigms might be as illustrated in Figure 9. The purpose of this table is to illustrate how a Biblical paradigm of inquiry would compare with positivism and constructivism.

**Figure 9 – A Comparison of Paradigms of Inquiry**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARADIGMS</th>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
<th>Divine Revelation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>Proving the World</td>
<td>Being-in-the-world</td>
<td>Created in God’s World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td>Testing Hypothesis</td>
<td>Building Meaning</td>
<td>Relating with God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Experiencing</td>
<td>Following God</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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21 See Guba and Lincoln (1994) for a full discussion of paradigms.
In comparing each paradigm, the positivist starts by doubting the world and having to conduct analysis to be convinced of its validity. He or she does this by formulating hypotheses, collecting pertinent data, and then either proving or disproving the hypothesis. The constructivist begins by acknowledging the world and defining his or her self by interacting with the world and others in order to create meaning. This paradigm is often seen as a reaction to the problems of positivism. The paradigm of divine revelation might be developed to propose that we see ourselves as God’s creatures in God’s creation. We come to know and understand ourselves and our world by relating to God, and we do this by following God.

If this paradigm of divine revelation were applied to ethnomusicology, the paradigm of inquiry might look like this: “Music is God’s gift to us” or “We were created to sing” (ontology); God is using music for his kingdom (epistemology); and “We are to use music for His kingdom” (methodology). This is only a suggestion and needs to be more thoroughly developed in accordance with other theological thought. Corbitt (1998) seems to have worked through some of this already.

Missiologists need to have a paradigm of inquiry that “stands up” to academic standards. Just as ethnomusicologists have heavily borrowed theories from other disciplines without ever fully developing their own, so missiologists need to develop their own paradigms without having to rely on secular ones.

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22 The disadvantages of this method have been listed and discussed by Guba and Lincoln (1994).
APPENDIX I

Quotes about Ethnomusicological Theories

"People make music meaningful and useful in their lives" (Wade 2004:1).

"We -- the authors -- believe that each society has a musical system that suits its culture. . . Using a model suggested by Alan P. Merriam, we look at music as a phenomenon that has three sides to it: sound, behavior, and conception or ideas" (Nettl, et al. 2004:6,7).

"I like to think of ethnomusicology as the study of people making music. People 'make' music in two ways: They make or construct the idea of music -- what it is (and is not) and what it does -- and they make or produce the sounds that they call music. ... people 'make' music into a cultural domain, with associated sets of ideas and activities" (Titon 2002:xiii).

"I suggest…The world is not like a text to be read but like a musical performance to be experienced" (Titon 1997:91).

“sciencing about music” (Merriam 1964) is “confronting the paradox that our subject was art, but our method science” (Titon 1997:253).

"My point here and in the rest of this chapter is to demonstrate how major an influence human interactions are -- interactions that can hardly fit into theoretical models" (Beaudry 1997:69).

“As a way of knowing and doing, fieldwork at its best is based on a model of friendship between people rather than on a model involving antagonism, surveillance, the observation of physical objects, or the contemplation of abstract ideas” (Titon 1992:321).

"Ethnomusicologists have come to realize that one cannot record and study the music of any people effectively without understanding the cultural context in which the music lives. At the same time, they realize that discussing the uses that a culture makes of music, its attitudes toward music, and the way in which music reflects the values of the society is likely to be meaningless without a knowledge of the music itself" (Nettl 1990:29).

"Music reflects and restructures culture at multiple levels" (King 1989:44-45).

"How people historically construct, socially maintain, and individually create and experience music" (Rice 1987:473).

"the study of music performance as an event and a process and of the resulting performance practices or products should concentrate on the actual musical and extra-musical behavior of participants (performers and audience), the consequent social interaction, the meaning of that interaction for the participants, and the rules or codes of
performance defined by the community for a specific context or occasion" (Behague 1984:7).

Ethnomusicology has four beliefs (Nettl 1983:9):
1. Study total music systems using a comparative approach.
2. Music must be understood as a part of culture.
   - How a culture musically defines itself, and the way music changes.
3. Fieldwork is essential. Concentrate on intensive work with few individuals.
4. We must study all of the world's music. (Past and present)

"The Changeability of Musical Experience" (Wachsmann 1982:211)

"The study of humanly produced patterns of sound . . . We focus upon the performance of music" (List 1979:1,2).

"music is the art, par excellence, that brings transcendence into the lives of humankind" (McAllester 1979:184).

"Musical sounds are not things... but products of human activity" (Gourlay 1978:12).

"The performance and dissemination of ethnic music” (Merriam 1975:56).

"Ethnomusicology is the hermeneutic science of human musical behavior" (Helser quoted in Merriam 1977).""Music cannot express anything extramusical unless the experience to which it refers already exists in the mind of the listener” (Blacking 1995:35)

"the things a people must know in order to understand, perform, and create acceptable music in their culture" (Feld 1974:211)

"Because music is humanly organized sound, it expresses aspects of the experience of individuals in society. It follows that any assessment of human musicality must account for processes that are extramusical, and that these should be included in analyses of music" (Blacking 1973:89).

"Music transforms experience" (McAllester 1971:380).

"I am convinced that only through the application of the most precise scientific methods, all of them - historical, descriptive, analytical, synthetic, comparative, critical - can we hope to understand the universals of music" (Hood 1971:349).

"Music sound is the result of human behavioral processes that are shaped by the values, attitudes, and beliefs of the people who comprise a particular culture" (Merriam 1964:6).
"Most ethnomusicologists agree that the structure of music and its cultural context are equally to be studied, and that both must be known in order for an investigation to be really adequate" (Nettl 1964:4).
APPENDIX II

Foundational reading

Models

1. Merriam’s Model (1964:chapter 1,2)
   Foundation of ethnomusicology for years: “sciencing about music”
2. Rice’s remodeling of Merriam’s Theory (1987)
   Trying to fill the holes in Merriam’s theory
   Built on a new epistemology

Epistemology

4. Gourlay’s Role of the Ethnomusicologist (1978)
   Challenges scientific mindset
5. Geertz’s Thick Description (1973:chapter 1)
   A new approach to anthropology
6. Titon’s and Rice’s Epistemologies (Barz 1997: Chapter 5,6)
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